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Abstract
We propose a new climate policy that is eﬃcient, robust, and asks
for payments proportional to realized climate damage. In each period,
countries are made liable for their share of the responsibility in the cur-
rent damage. Eﬃciency follows from countries’ anticipations of climate
change, hence of future payments. Robustness is achieved thanks to the
introduction of a market for carbon liabilities. Rather than being based
on the expected discounted sum of future marginal damage (as with a
carbon tax or tradable emission permits) our proposal relies only on ob-
served realized damage and on the well-documented emission history of
countries.
Keywords: Climate Policy, Stock Pollutants, Cap and Trade.
JEL classification code: Q54, H23.
Climate policies that rely on economic instruments, such as emissions taxes
or cap-and-trade programs, exact immediate payments on the basis that cli-
mate damage will occur in the future. In principle, an optimal carbon tax asks
emitters to pay today the expected discounted marginal damage of emissions,
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according to some climate damage scenarios–over the next decades, sometimes
centuries–that may or may not materialize. Likewise, the number of tradable
permits issued in an eﬃcient cap-and-trade programs is also contingent on said
scenarios, eﬀectively costing emitters the full expected consequences of their
emissions flows upon emitting. Should these scenarios or mankind’s responsi-
bility in them prove inaccurate, such anticipatory schemes would cause needless
disruptions to the economy.
Instead, we argue in favor of holding countries liable for climate damage
arising from their greenhouse gas emissions through the creation of a market for
liabilities. Concretely, emitting CO2 in the atmosphere would be accompanied
by the issuance of a carbon liability : a legal duty for the bearer to pay damages
over time as climate damage occurs.1 In other words, the bearers of carbon
liabilities would be repaying their debt to the world in installments rather than
upfront. Carbon liabilities would not expire, but would instead decay at the
same rate as atmospheric CO2, all the while holding its bearers accountable for
paying carbon damages as climate damage occurs. Carbon liabilities could be
sold to other countries, by paying them to honor their newly acquired responsi-
bility in future climate damage. Free trade on the global market would ensure
eﬃciency.
The idea of using liabilities as a means to controlling externalities traces back
to Calabresi (1970) and was recently compared to corrective taxation in Shavell
(2011). On the one hand, regulation (taxation) is costly even in the absence
of damage, whereas a liability approach only kicks in when harm actually oc-
curs. On the other hand, a liability approach is typically more informationally
demanding because it requires establishing tort (Kolstad et al, 1990; Shavell,
2011). Hence, a liability approach is likely to be more appropriate in situations
where damage is highly uncertain but where its source can be easily established.
This is precisely the case of climate change, where the magnitude of damage is
typically unknown but the responsibility of countries towards CO2 concentration
can be readily established thanks to available data on cumulated CO2 emissions
per country (CAIT, World Bank).2
1For expositional purposes, we shall speak only in terms of CO2.
2The liability approach is usually discussed in the context of tort law, involving private par-
ties and legal costs attached to lawsuits, to establishing due care and negligence. By contrast,
the liability approach we consider here is public, in the sense that it involves countries, and
would consist in an automatic procedure where the negligence rule plays no role. Countries
would be held responsible for climate damage according to their past emissions.
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Even in absence of (environmental) externalities, some intervention may de-
sirable in economies with uncertainty. There are several reasons for that, like
imperfect insurance markets and misperception of risks. But even without these
"market imperfections", the very existence of idiosyncratic risk generates ex-
post inequality–ex ante equal agents, taking identical decisions, end up gener-
ally unequal ex post–to which it is very diﬃcult not to object. We deal with the
issue of environmental inequality as following from the arbitrary (geographical)
distribution of damages in a separate paper. In practice, the revenues gener-
ated from carbon damages could accrue to an international climate fund and
be redistributed in an eﬃciency-preserving fashion (Billette de Villemeur and
Leroux, 2011).
Abstracting from redistributive concerns, we consider here the intertemporal
optimal allocation problem as attached to climate change.3
1 Eﬃciency
Let {Dt}+∞t=0 denote the flow of stochastic damage as attached to anthropogenic
climate change. At any period, the occurrence and the magnitude of this damage
is assumed to be an increasing function of Zt, the current stock of anthropogenic
CO2 in the atmosphere. Our proposal consists in converting CO2 emissions
into financial debt. More precisely, in each period, all countries are required
to contribute to an international climate fund to the tune of μtZ
j
t where μt =
dDt
dZt
4 is the marginal climate damage due to anthropogenic emissions and where
Zjt =
Pt
s=−∞ γ
sXjs is the contribution of country j to the stock Zt (it is the
discounted sum of its past emissions Xjs , for all s ≤ t, accounting for their
natural decay at rate 1− γ).
Proposition 1 Such a carbon debt scheme yields first-best emission patterns.
3Hammond (1981) considers the problem of implementing optimal intertemporal alloca-
tions in the presence of risk. In a setting where the welfare theorems apply, with competitive
contingent markets and in the absence of externalities, he argues that bonds may be able to
correct the imperfections of an Arrow-Debreu market economy when individuals misperceive
risk. We argue that carbon liabilites play a similar role to Hammond’s bonds in the presence
of an intertemporal climate externality. [Vérifier]
4Unlike in tort law, we do not aim for "full liability" because it is not optimal to cover all
the costs. Rather, we require countries to pay for the marginal damage they induce, hence
our use of the phrase "eﬃcient carbon liabilities".
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Proof. Under rational expectations, country i evaluates its present net
benefit as:
Bi =
+∞X
t=0
βt
£
Bit
¡
Xit
¢
− μtZit
¤
, (1)
Country i then chooses an emissions stream
¡
Xit
¢∞
t=0 such that:
∂Bit
∂Xit
= Et
"
+∞X
s=t
βs−tμs
∂Zis
∂Xit
#
= Et
"
+∞X
s=t
(γβ)s−t
∂Ds
∂Zs
#
(2)
under the usual Pigovian assumption that no single agent has an impact on
marginal damage. Each country equalizes its marginal benefit with the ex-
pected discounted value of marginal climate damage, thus achieving first-best
eﬃciency.¥
Notice that the only information required of the planner to implement our
scheme, on top of the well-documented emission history of countries, is μt =
dDt
dZt
:
the marginal impact of current anthropogenic CO2 concentration on the current
flow of climate damage. While obtaining this information accurately may be no
small task, it seems far less daunting to be working with observed data than with
predictions over future decades or centuries. Indeed, the information required to
implement an eﬃcient carbon tax, τ , or the equivalent cap-and-trade program
is the expected, discounted sum of the marginal impacts of current emissions on
future climate damage:
τ t = Et
"
+∞X
s=t
βs−t
∂Zis
∂Xit
∂Ds
∂Zs
#
= Et
"
+∞X
s=t
(γβ)s−t
∂Ds
∂Zs
#
.
From a policy standpoint, implementing our carbon debt policy is simpler
than implementing a cap-and-trade program. Under our scheme, carbon debt is
issued and allocated systematically based on each country’s observed emissions.
By contrast, cap-and-trade schemes require a planner to issue and allocate per-
mits with the obvious risks of miscalculation and misallocation, respectively.
The upshot of requiring less of the planner is that much more freedom is left
to the countries, thus allowing for more decentralization than, say, a carbon tax
policy. Specifically, countries make their own predictions about future damage
and work with their own discount factors. Section 2 addresses how trade can
maintain eﬃciency in the case where countries have diﬀerent discount factors
and diﬀerent expectations about future anthropogenic climate damage.
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2 Robustness
If debt can traded, our approach is robust to heterogeneity in discount factors
and to diverging forecasts. If discount factors and forecasts are country-specific
Expression (2) becomes:
∂Bit
∂Xit
= Eit
"
+∞X
s=t
(γβi)
s−t μs
#
where βi and Eit are the discount factor and the expectations of country i,
respectively.
Country heterogeneity would yield trade opportunities: a market for debt
would leave it to countries to determine how much debt they wish to hold based
on their predictions of future climate change damage. Should opinions diﬀer
on the likelihood and magnitude of future damage, or on the discount rate,
eﬃciency would be maintained through trade.
Specifically, given a competitive market price, pt, countries may choose to
buy carbon debt–and be paid to do so–or to sell them, by paying others to
hold debt in their stead.
Proposition 2 Consider a carbon debt scheme where installments are set to
current marginal climate damage: μt =
∂Dt
∂Zt
. Allowing carbon debt to be traded
maintains eﬃciency while decentralizing preferences and beliefs.
Proof. We show that eﬃciency is robust to heterogeneity in countries’
discount factors. The proof assuming countries formulate diﬀerent expectations
about future damage, Eit , proceeds similarly.
Suppose countries have heterogeneous discount factors. Assume country j
sells Y jt units of the debt associated to its current emissons, X
j
t + Y
j
t . Its
expected net present benefit writes as follows:
Bj =
+∞X
t=0
βtjE0
h
Bjt
³
Xjt + Y
j
t
´
− ptY jt −
h
μtZ
j
t + c
j
t
³
ptZ
j
t
´ii
,
where cjt is the cost of holding financial debt for country j at date t and
Zjt = γZ
j
t−1 +X
j
t
is the amount of carbon debt held by country j at date t.The sole purpose of
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introducing a cost of holding financial debt is to ensure an interior solution. We
interpret it as country default risk and therefore assume it to be negligible for
usual levels of debt. We assume cjt to be increasing, strictly convex, and such
that cjt (0) = 0.
Similarly, assume country i purchases Y it units of debt, as measured in carbon
stock units. Its expected net present benefit writes as follows:
Bi =
+∞X
t=0
βtiE0
£
Bit
¡
Xit
¢
+ ptY it −
£
μtZ
i
t + c
i
t
¡
ptZit
¢¤¤
,
where the carbon stock for which country i is considered to be responsible now
writes:
Zit = γZ
i
t−1 +X
i
t + Y
i
t
From the point of view of a net seller of carbon debt, the first-order conditions
write as follows:
∂Bjt
∂Xjt
= Et
"
+∞X
s=t
βs−tj
∂Zjs
∂Xjt
£
μs + psc
0j ¡psZis¢¤
#
= Et
"
+∞X
s=t
¡
γβj
¢s−t ∙∂Ds
∂Zs
+ psc0j
¡
psZjs
¢¸#
∂Bjt
∂Y jt
= pt
From the point of view of a net buyer of carbon debt, the first-order conditions
are the following:
∂Bit
∂Xit
= Et
"
+∞X
s=t
βs−ti
∂Zis
∂Xit
£
μs + psc
0i ¡psZis¢¤
#
= Et
"
+∞X
s=t
(γβi)
s−t
∙
∂Ds
∂Zs
+ psc0i
¡
psZis
¢¸#
pt = Et
"
+∞X
s=t
βs−ti
∂Zis
∂Y it
£
μs + psc
0i ¡psZis¢¤
#
= Et
"
+∞X
s=t
(γβi)
s−t
∙
∂Ds
∂Zs
+ psc0i
¡
psZis
¢¸#
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It follows that, for all i:
∂Bit
∂Xit
= pt,
and for all j
pt =
∂Bjt
∂Y jt
=
∂Bjt
∂Xjt
,
yielding eﬃciency.¥
A possible interpretation of Proposition 2 is that our scheme allows for di-
verging opinions regarding climate change.
It is noteworthy that our mechanism is also robust in the sense of being
immune to manipulation both in the discount factor and in the expectations
because the final allocation of debt is a competitive market outcome.
Remark 3 Because our scheme financializes the carbon debt, failure to honor
the latter is now no diﬀerent than a default in the repayment of financial debt.
Hence, the introduction of a market for carbon debt makes our mechanism
deviation-proof and robust to misrepresentation.
3 Liability
Although there is some evidence that climate change already has an impact
on economic outcomes, climate damage remains highly uncertain and volatile.
It follows that ex ante approaches to climate policy exhibit the unappealing
feature of possibly requiring high payments when realized damage is low. To
avoid this disconnectedness we turn to a liability approach, which links payments
to realized harm.5
Assume that payments are adjusted according to realized damage, D (Zt).
More precisely, assume that countries are actually required to pay μtZitIDt ,
where
IDt =
D (Zt)
Et [D (Zt)]
is the ratio of the realized over the expected damage.6
5A similar debate already exists within tort law, comparing the regulatory approach with
the liability approach. One of the main advantages of the latter is that payments reflect
realized harm whereas the former is based on the possibility of harm. On this, see Shavell
(1984, 2011) and Kolstad et al (1990).
6Expectation is assumed to be taken at the beginning of the period.
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Proposition 4 The liability rule μtZitIDt is first-best eﬃcient, robust and yields
payments proportional to realized climate damage.
Proof. By definition, Es [IDt ] = 1 for all s ≤ t, so that expected payments
are unchanged. Hence, from Proposition 1, the liability rule is first-best eﬃcient.
For the same reason, from Proposition 2, it is robust to misrepresentation and
deviations. Furthermore, μtZitIDt is indeed proportional to realized harm:
μtZ
i
tIDt =
dDt
dZt
Zit
Dt (Zt)
Et [D (Zt)]
=
Zit
Zt
(dDt/dZt)
Et [Dt (Zt) /Zt]
Dt (Zt) .¥
If the damage function, Dt, were linear, payments would exactly cover total
damage and countries would pay in proportion to their emission contributions:
μtZitIDt =
Zit
Zt
Dt (Zt). If the damage function is convex, total payments add
up to more than the realized damage because first-best eﬃciency requires going
beyond full liability.7
Remark 5 Full liability constitutes a conservative policy where payments rely
only on realized damage, and not even on some estimate of the marginal dam-
age function. In Europe and in the U.S., the field of environmental damage
estimation is already well developed.
7The incompatibility between first-best eﬃciency and budget balance is well-known. See,
e.g., Billette de Villemeur and Leroux (2011).
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